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Agenda
 Introduction
 The problem – Censorship
 A solution – P2P and HTTPS proxies
 The details
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Introduction
 People use Internet for many good things
– Information acquisition 
• Google, news papers
– Information publishing / expression of opinion
• Blogs, Twitter
– Social networking incl. organization of protest
• Facebook
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The Problem
 Threat to oppressive regimes' information monopole
 Citizens can
– acquire too much information
– publish “negative” information
– mobilize against regimes
 Regimes apply firewalls to filter information
– control what citizens know
– suppress protest
– prosecute dissidents
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The Problem (cntd.)
 Need tools to circumvent firewall on a large scale
 Simple HTTP(S) Proxies
– Easily blockable
 TOR
– Built for anonymity rather than censorship resistance
– Varying performance
 P2P-Based
– Mainly academic
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A Solution
 Practical P2P-based HTTPS proxy
– Nodes offer and use proxy service at the same time
– Use existing DHT network for node lookup
– Whitelist approach
– Anti-forgery with signing servers
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Details – Mode of Operation
 HTTPS Proxy circumvents Firewall
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Details – Mode of Operation
 HTTPS Proxy circumvents Firewall
 But how to find Proxy IPs?
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Details – Node Discovery
 Publish own IP in DHT as source for key “X”
 Query source IPs for key “X”
 Quick variation of node list
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Details – Node Discovery
 Publish own IP in DHT as source for key “X”
 Query source IPs for key “X”
 Quick variation of node list
 But how to detect IP spoofing?
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Details – IP Signing Servers
 Central signing servers
 Generate signature for requesting IP address
 Nodes present this signature to prove their IP address
– Not possible for firewall to generate fake signature
➔ Cannot spoof IP
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More Details
 Whitelisting – Only allow “legal” web sites
– Google, news papers, Facebook, Twitter…
➔ Legal protection for relay nodes
 Only allow HTTPS traffic
➔ No eavesdropping on relay side
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Thank you!
Questions?
